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BEYOND LAW AND ECONOMICS: THEOLOGICAL 
ETHICS AND THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DEBATE 
David E. DeCosse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The vociferous national debates in Congress and the courts about 
defining the statutory and constitutional lines between private prop-
erty and public regulatory authority ultimately can shape our funda-
mental conceptions of democratic government and the social contract. 
These battles most often are pitched in terms of law and economics. 
This Article attempts to introduce a new perspective on the de-
bates-a theological ethics analysis of issues arising in the regulatory 
takings setting. The particular analytical perspective here is based on 
Roman Catholic theology, but it offers avenues for a welcome exten-
sion of the inquiry by scholars from other religious traditions as well. 
It will be helpful at the outset to consider in the light of history the 
challenges posed to Catholic social teaching by takings legislation now 
before Congress. As amid scarce resources in medieval times when 
lords protested with increasing vigor against claims to commons that 
ran over their lands, so today amid economic uncertainty powerful 
corporations have taken a lead role in supporting takings bills that 
* David E. DeCosse is a doctoral student in theological ethics in a joint program at Boston 
College and the Weston Jesuit School of Theology. 
The idea for this paper originated with Walt Grazer of the Environmental Justice Program 
of the United States Catholic Conference (U.S.C.C.). An earlier version of this Article was 
presented to the U.S.C.C. as a background paper to aid U.S.C.C. in its evaluation of federal 
takings legislation. The current Article, however, entirely reflects the author's opinion and 
makes no claim to represent the opinion of the U.S.C.C. The author would like to thank Mr. 
Grazer, David Hollenbach, S.J., J. Bryan Hehir, and Angela Carmella for their comments on 
drafts of the Article. 
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would restrict allegedly intrusive regulation of their land.1 Moreover, 
the medieval struggle pitted the lords' overly rigorous claims to title 
against customary, if not always explicit, rights of common use. In 
turn, the conflict in Washington over takings legislation features an 
absolutist school of property rights claiming a long historical pedigree 
squared off against environmentalists invoking the benefits of envi-
ronmentallaws adopted only in the last thirty years-and struggling 
as they do to specify to an economically anxious public the immediate 
relevance of new, recondite terms like ''biodiversity'' and "ecosystem."2 
To be sure, this historical comparison has limits. For one, it would 
be a mistake to assume that the only supporters of today's federal 
takings laws are also its most powerful ones-large corporations akin 
to latter-day lords. In fact, congressional supporters of takings legis-
lation argue that it is a long-overdue guarantee of the "rights of every 
small landowner in America."s Nevertheless, this comparison of the 
present day to medieval times sets the context for what follows in this 
Article, for it underscores in broad terms the perduring challenges 
raised by takings legislation for Catholic social teaching: the need to 
balance private and social aspects of property against the perennially 
powerful appeal of absolute property rights; the opportunity to ar-
ticulate persuasively an ethic that establishes with clarity the moral 
claims raised by the common good of the environment; and the re-
quirement to recognize the properly historical character of purport-
edly absolute claims-and thus to recognize the economic circum-
stances amid which such claims often arise and the political possibilities 
that such claims can subvert. 
In particular, this Article argues that the absolutist property claim 
behind the takings legislation poses an anti-democratic threat to fed-
eral environmental protection, as well as to labor laws, civil rights 
standards, and similar measures. The argument in part follows the 
1 The account of the medieval conflict is taken from selections from an article by Joseph Sax. 
Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 185, 186-94 (1980), in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 407-11 (1992). 
[L]ook at the bill as adopted. Who are the special interests supporting this? The 
National Mining Association, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Inde-
pendent Refiners Association, American Forest and Paper Association, and Interna-
tional Council of Shopping Centers. Those do not sound like small landowners to me. 
141 CONGo REC. H2531 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Sam Farr (D-Cal.». 
2 PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at 407-11. 
3141 CONGo REC. H2494 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.». 
1996] THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 831 
path laid out by Mary Ann Glendon in Rights Talk: The Impoverish-
ment of Political Discourse. As Professor Glendon notes, the insistent 
assertion today of absolute rights has led to a disdain for the compro-
mises achievable in politics.4 Extrapolating from this, I shall argue 
that the strong assertion of property rights behind takings legislation 
subverts the possibility of a just political solution to the conflicting 
claims of property holders and environmentalists.5 Furthermore, I 
shall argue that takings bills have as their premise notions of private 
property, the state, and the common good which are sharply at odds 
with these concepts as they appear in Catholic social teaching. More-
over, I will argue that a Catholic social ethic provides a set of balanc-
ing principles by which to resolve conflicts such as those raised by 
proposed takings legislation. By focusing on these particular bills, I 
also hope to illuminate aspects of broader intellectual challenges cer-
tain to be posed in the coming years to Catholic social ethics in the 
United States. 
At issue in this controversy is legislation The New York Times has 
noted "would arguably affect more people than anything else consid-
ered by Congress this session."6 The key provision of this legislation 
would require taxpayers to compensate a property owner whenever 
a federal government action reduced the value of that person's prop-
erty.7 For example, if the legislation were passed, the federal govern-
ment would have to pay $20,000 to a property owner who claimed that 
a denial of a permit to build on the property's wetlands reduced the 
value of a $100,000 lot by twenty percent. In March, the House of 
Representatives passed its version of this bill, which requires com-
pensation after a twenty percent loss in value and purchase by the 
4 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 5 
(1991). 
5 It is important to note that in Rights Talk Professor Glendon does not take a position on 
takings legislation. Moreover, while she criticizes the intellectual basis of absolute claims of 
property rights, she also laments what she describes as the steady erosion in the last half-cen-
tury in the United States of the constitutional value of the right to property at the hands of 
overreaching legislatures. She explains the relationship of these two aspects of her criticism by 
noting: 
[t]he historic rise and decline of property rights in our constitutional scheme has been 
outlined here not only in order to further illustrate our American tendency to formulate 
rights in a stark, unqualified, fashion, but to suggest how such habits of exaggeration 
can foster the illusion that the rights in question are more secure than they are in fact. 
[d. at 40. 
6 Timothy Egan, Unlikely Alliances Attack Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
1995, at AI. 
7 See id. 
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government after a fifty percent loss in value.8 The House Bill applies 
to such environmental laws as the Clean Water Act, the Endangered 
Species Act, and laws related to western water usage. The House Bill 
would not permit compensation if actions undertaken by a property 
owner would violate common law nuisance standards, traditionally a 
far less restrictive prohibition than that accorded by state and federal 
law.9 The Senate presently is considering its version of the legislation, 
which would require compensation after a one-third loss in a prop-
erty's value.lo 
These property rights initiatives appeared in the Republican Con-
tract with America along with similar proposals to require federal 
agencies to undertake extensive analyses of the cost and risk of 
environmental regulation. The Contract describes this group of pro-
posals as a "variety of tax law changes and federal bureaucratic 
reforms designed to enhance private property rights and economic 
liberty and make government more accountable for burdens it im-
poses on American workers."ll The takings bills, in particular, are the 
principal legislative goals of a loose coalition of western-based prop-
erty rights groups that calls itself the "wise use" movement.12 Among 
the central claims of the coalition is the argument that federal envi-
ronmental regulation is running amok in the hands of intrusive bu-
reaucrats and is overriding the right to private property. As one 
Californian told a House of Representatives subcommittee: 
[i]t's time for Congress to admit that the bureaucratic regulations 
promulgated from the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species 
Act and other federal land-use legislation gives far too much 
unchecked power to out of control bureaucrats. It's time for Con-
gress to stand up to the tunnel-visioned preservationists who 
want the government to control every inch of the land, every use 
and every specie. IS 
8 See id. 
9 See generally 141 CONGo REC. H2590-2607 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995); 141 CONGo REC. H2494-
2566 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995). 
10 See generally 141 CONGo REC. S4497-4504 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995). 
11 HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 33-
37 (1994); see also Scott Allen, "Contract" Reframes Issue of Environment's Worth, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 25; Tom Kenworthy, GOP Plan to Broaden Property Rights Could Cost 
Public Dearly, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at A7. 
12 See CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN & RICHARD J. ROBBEWlG, TAKINGS LAW IN PLAIN 
ENGLISH, 10-11 (1994); PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-16 (Supp. 1994). 
13 Regulatory Takings and Property Rights: Hearings on HR925 before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Judiciary Comm. of the House of Representatives, l04th Cong., 1st. Sess. 4 
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Congressman Thomas Delay (R-Tex.), the House majority whip, 
spoke for many of the bill's supporters when he invoked the promise 
of the American Revolution for the protection of property, criticized 
the arbitrariness of Federal environmental action and the dispropor-
tionate value accorded to animals like the "golden-cheeked warbler," 
and argued that "one person should not have to shoulder the full costs 
of achieving a particular goal, whether it be environmental protection 
or improved infrastructure."14 The government compensates a person, 
Representative Delay said, when it wants "to build a highway through 
his front yard."15 It should compensate a person as well when it 
"prohibits him from farming on his land because it is determined that 
a wetland needs protection."16 
Is the federal government running amok with environmental regu-
lations? This claim should be examined carefully. Environmentalists 
have argued, for instance, that it is not the overabundance of environ-
mental regulation but rather its effectiveness which has led to the 
current takings backlash. In the 1980's, environmentalists argue, de-
velopers, flush with easy savings-and-Ioan money and generous fed-
eral tax breaks, ran headlong into good environmental law and into 
government and citizen groups that knew how to apply that law. 
Stymied in their desire to develop, the developers turned to takings 
proposals to regain a justifiably lost freedom.17 
Claims of constriction at the hands of a federal leviathan also are 
often not what they seem. Ocie Mills, for instance, is a Floridian who 
gained notoriety when he was jailed for violating federal wetlands 
regulations. To Congressman Joe Scarborough (R-Fla.), Mills's fate is 
"one of the starkest illustrations of how crazy regulations have be-
come over the past 20 years."18 Yet, Mr. Mills only was jailed for 
wetlands violations, the judge in his case noted, after Mills was told 
"constantly and regularly and continually by the Federal Government 
that he couldn't do these things, and he took the position, 'Well, we'll 
see you in COurt."'19 Nor was Mills's case part of a broad pattern of 
criminalizing petty wetlands disputes. According to the Environmental 
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Hearing] (testimony of Nancy Cline, Fairness to Land Owners Com-
mittee). 
14141 CONGo REC. H2514 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Thomas Delay (R-Tex.». 
15 [d. (statement of Rep. Delay). 
16 [d. (statement of Rep. Delay). 
17 DUERKSEN & ROBBEWIG, supra note 12, at 10. 
18 Egan, supra note 6, at AI, A12. 
19 [d. 
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Protection Agency (EPA), the federal government authorized 45,000 
wetlands activities in 1994 and sought court enforcement in fewer 
than 30 cases.20 
Between 1963 and 1993 the federal government passed 178 envi-
ronmental laws. Between 1933 and 1963 it passed only 45.21 To the 
present staff of the Department of the Interior, the United States 
owes its current high standards of beauty, health, and productivity in 
large measure to the wisdom behind previous years' environmental 
laws. The takings legislation, the Department of the Interior noted, 
"is a Trojan horse, filled with devastating proposals that would deci-
mate the kinds of protections that Americans have relied on for dec-
ades."22 Congressman Melvin Watt (D-N.C.) argued that portraying 
regulators as running amok is inaccurate from the start because it 
assumes a wide gulf between regulations and their enabling laws: 
I do not know of any agency in the Federal Government that is 
over there writing regulations, unless they are writing those regu-
lations pursuant to statutes that we passed in this body. And if we 
do not like the regulations that they write pursuant to our stat-
utes, then we ought to change the statutes. We ought to have the 
guts to stand up and say, "We do not like the Clean Water Act, 
we do not like the Endangered Species Act, and we are going to 
do away with them," rather than coming and telling the American 
people that somebody else over there on the other side of town 
has done something that we do not like, even though they are 
acting pursuant to the authority we gave them.23 
The current House and Senate proposals are referred to as "tak-
ings" bills because they represent a novel legislative application of 
principles of eminent domain derived from the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution-"nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."24 The principal recent 
theoretical work providing the intellectual framework for these bills 
is the 1985 book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain [hereinafter Takings], by Richard A. Epstein, Professor 
of Law of the University of Chicago. In this highly controversial work, 
Professor Epstein develops an entire theory of government based on 
20 Robert Perciasepe, Assist. Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 1995, at A14 (Letters to the Editor). 
21 PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at App. I (Supp. 1994). 
22 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A NEW ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM, PRESS RELEASE 3 (Dec. 
14, 1994). 
23 141 CONGo REC. H2506 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt (D-N.C.». 
24 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Central to Professor Epstein's 
argument is the notion that any government regulation takes prop-
erty and thus may require compensation by the government. As 
Professor Epstein puts it: "Would the government action be treated 
as a taking of private property if it had been performed by some 
private party? If so, there is a taking of private property, and we must 
examine further to determine whether compensation must be paid."25 
Professor Epstein also argues that the Fifth Amendment, properly 
understood, provides the grounds for invalidating, among other things, 
welfare programs, progressive taxation, the minimum wage, and the 
National Labor Relations Act-all of which, in his view, fail the req-
uisite constitutional test in that they fail to increase the sum total of 
wealth.26 In other words, these laws are unconstitutional because they 
either transfer property from one party to another without payment 
of just compensation or because they fail to preserve and enhance the 
given distribution of wealth extant before any such law was passed.27 
Professor Epstein's ideas would no doubt lead to overturning much 
of the last fifty years of American jurisprudence. Indeed, Thomas 
Grey of Stanford Law School has called Takings a "travesty of con-
stitutional scholarship" because the book fails to engage in argument 
the main trajectories of this last half-century of legal thinking.28 Yet, 
the thrust of Takings has had a profound influence, not only on pend-
ing takings legislation, but also on other proposals now before the 
House and Senate. 
Indeed, the proposed takings legislation would, in fact, represent a 
significant legal change from current constitutional practice. In the 
1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes gave birth to modern takings jurisprudence when he wrote 
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."29 The 
vagueness of Holmes's dictum has been criticized for providing little 
guidance to courts and meek restraint on the government's regulatory 
power. Yet, the dictum was also a statement of principle-one that 
was meant to permit courts a necessary latitude in the face of the 
25 RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 36 (1985) (emphasis added). 
26 See generally id. 
27Id. at 306-29. 
28 Thomas C. Grey, Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain: The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24-29 
(1986). 
29 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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complexity of property cases.30 In any event, state and federal courts 
over the years have developed principles for interpreting when a 
regulation has gone "too far," including: an assessment of the economic 
impact of a regulation on a property owner; an evaluation of this 
impact against the public benefit promoted by the legislation; a re-
quirement that for a taking to have occurred the property must have 
lost its entire value; a judgement that the loss of the most profitable 
use or of a fraction of the value of the property is not sufficient to 
constitute a taking; and an inclination on the part of courts to defer 
to a legislative determination of legitimate public use.31 While there 
has been a loud outcry today against a constitutional devaluation of 
property rights, it is also important to note a sharp disagreement in 
this regard. For instance, environmental lawyer and Professor of Law 
of Boston College Law School, Zygmunt J.B. Plater, has argued that 
even today courts' scrutiny is directed more at protecting the private 
right of a property owner than at taking into account the public claims 
at stake in environmental cases. To remedy this tendency, Professor 
Plater and others have argued, for instance, for an increasing use by 
judges of the public trust doctrine, to accord a measure of defined 
public ownership to certain common resources. Indeed, there are 
interesting affinities between the public trust doctrine's assertion of 
common things-lakes, rivers, forests-that either cannot or should 
not be owned privately and thus that are in fact held in deed by the 
public and the Catholic understanding of a common good like the 
environment.32 
In light of these established constitutional practices, it is instructive 
to consider the positions of legal supporters and opponents of the 
proposed takings bills. To James Ely, Professor of Law of Vanderbilt 
University School of Law, the proposed takings legislation would 
introduce a welcome certainty to replace the vague guidance of Hol-
mes's dictum in Mahon;33 spread the cost of public burdens broadly 
by requiring taxpayers to compensate a property owner for a loss in 
value resulting from regulation; give needed pause to government 
officials as they weigh environmental enforcement; and enhance demo-
cratic accountability by requiring an impulsive state to pay for an 
intemperate regulatory appetite.34 Conversely, to an opponent like J. 
30 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595-96 (2d ed. 1988) (1978). 
31 DUERKSEN & ROBBEWIG, supra note 12, at 5-22. 
32 PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at 365-74, 453. 
33 260 U.S. at 415. 
34 1995 Hearing, supra note 13, at 15 (Feb. 10, 1995) (testimony of James W. Ely, Jr., Professor 
of Law, Vanderbilt Univ. School of Law). 
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Peter Byrne, Professor of Law of Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, the pending bills would cripple the legislation of legitimate public 
interests; create perverse incentives for property owners to file de-
velopment plans in the hope of incurring a loss in value in property 
for which they could then collect money from the government; and 
render void the longstanding constitutional test for a taking.35 
II. PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The defense of the right to private property has been a constant 
theme of modern Catholic social teaching-from Leo XIII's lengthy 
justification of the right in the opening pages of Rerum Novarum36 to 
John Paul II's forceful reaffirmation of this teaching in Centesimus 
Annus.37 In turn, environmental protection also has gained special 
prominence in Catholic teaching in recent decades. In Sollicutudo Rei 
Socialis38 in 1987, John Paul II called the growing world-wide ecologi-
cal concern one of the "positive signs" of the day.39 In an address 
commemorating the 1990 World Day of Peace, Pope John Paul II said: 
"[t]he profound sense that the earth is 'suffering' is also shared by 
those who do not profess our faith in God. Indeed, the increasing 
devastation of the world of nature is apparent to all."40 As the pro-
posed takings legislation primarily raises questions about the good of 
the environment and the rights of private property owners, I now will 
examine these issues as they are understood in Catholic social teach-
ing and in relation to the pending bills. 
When John Paul II has discussed ecological matters, he has often 
done so in light of the morality of property. For instance, in Cen-
tesimus,41 the Pope stated that the origin of the environmental prob-
lem of the day can be found in the heart of men and women-in a 
domineering "desire to have and to enjoy rather than to be and to 
grow" and, thus, in a possessiveness that manifests itself in a dis or-
35 [d. at 1-5 (Feb. 9, 1995) (testimony of J. Peter Byrne, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center). 
36 POPE LEO XIII, RERUM Nov ARUM (1878). 
37 POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNus (1978) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS]. 
3SPOPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICUTUDO REI SOCIALIS (1987) [hereinafter SOLLICUTUDO]. All 
subsequent references to church documents will be by paragraph number. 
39 [d. ~ 26. 
40 Pope John Paul II, Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the 
World Day of Peace (June 1, 1990) in VATICAN CITY, LIBRERIA ED/TRICE VATICANA 5 [here-
inafter World Day of Peace Message]. 
41 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, ~ 37. 
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dered consumption and use of the earth's resources.42 Indeed, in Pope 
John Paul II's view, the very development of a person depends on 
nothing less than "subordinating the possession, dominion, and use of 
created things and the products of industry to man's divine likeness 
and vocation to immortality."43 As the Pope continues, from such a 
subordination and proper ordering of values can arise "an unselfish 
and aesthetic attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being 
and of the beauty which enables one to see in visible things the 
message of the invisible God who created them,"44 and a concrete 
concern for the inevitable consequences of the degradation of the 
earth on human life today and in the future.45 
Thus, Catholic teaching about the environment insists on a careful 
balance. It first stresses the original gift of creation and the ontologi-
cal difference between all that is created and God. In other words, 
Catholic environmental teaching affirms what Michael and Kenneth 
Himes have called the "'iffiness' of one's existence .... This poverty 
unites all creatures."46 Nevertheless, the Catholic Church recognizes 
in the human person a primacy over the rest of creation: "[m]an is the 
image of God partly through the mandate received from his creator 
to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, 
every human being, reflects the very action of the creator of the 
universe."47 Yet, this mandate to exercise "dominion" can in no way 
be understood in the exploitive sense of "domination." As one com-
mentator has noted: "[t]he Pope affirms 'the dominion' of humanity 
over the rest of creation, but insists that this dominion is circum-
scribed by morallimits"48-the limits that are imposed on every per-
son as a steward of the earth.49 
Today, however, these fundamental convictions essential to a re-
spect for the environment often are overlooked. Indeed, according to 
Pope John Paul II, in their place is a "widespread anthropological 
error" arising from those who discover a "capacity to transform and 
in a certain sense create the world through . . . work" and in the 
42 [d. 
43 SOLLICUTUDO, supra note 38, ~ 29. 
44 [d. ~ 37. 
45 [d. n 31-34. 
46 Drew Christiansen, Ecology, Justice, and Development, THEOLOGICAL STUD. 51, 76 (Mar. 
1990). 
47 POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ~ 4 (1982) [hereinafter LABOREM]. 
48 Christiansen, supra note 46, at 70. 
49 [d. 
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process forget that the possibility and success of their work "is always 
based on God's prior and original gift of the things that are."50 Thus, 
people turn in pride against the earth, as though it "did not have its 
own requisites and a prior God-given purpose,"5! and as if its biological 
and moral laws could be violated with impunity.52 
Against this proud abuse of the earth, the Catholic Church not only 
offers the converting message of the Gospel, but also some practical 
guidance. Pope John Paul II, for instance, has emphasized the need 
to respect the individual nature of every being and of every being's 
indispensable connection to the cosmos.53 Thus the Pope has called for 
attention to the issue of endangered species-an aspect of the debate 
over the takings legislation-saying that "people are rightly wor-
ried-though much less than they should be-about preserving the 
natural habitats of the various animal species threatened with extinc-
tion, because they realize that each of these species makes its particu-
lar contribution to the balance of nature in general."54 In more general 
fashion, Pope John Paul II also has noted the interconnectedness of 
the entire ecological question-an observation that, in terms of the 
takings debate, points toward the need for an adequate governmental 
role in protecting vast, often multi-state ecosystems. As the Pope 
said: "[ w]e cannot interfere in one area of the ecosystem without 
paying due attention both to the consequences of such interference in 
other areas and to the well-being of future generations."55 
While the proposed takings legislation likely would make federal 
environmental protection more difficult, that consequence must be 
considered alongside perhaps the principal aim of the legislation: the 
defense of property rights. Accordingly, it will be useful next to 
consider Catholic teaching regarding private property in light of as-
sumptions about the inviolability of the right to property implicit in 
the takings legislation. 
As with ecological concerns, it is necessary first to consider the 
Catholic Church's longstanding affirmation of the right to private 
property in light of the doctrine of creation. In his discussion of 
private property in Centesimus, Pope John Paul II stated: "God gave 
50 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, ~ 37. 
51 [d. 
52 See SOLLICUTUDO, supra note 38, ~ 34. 
5;) See id. 
54 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, ~ 38. 
55 World Day of Peace Message, supra note 40, at 6. 
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the earth to the whole human race for the sustenance of all its mem-
bers, without excluding or favoring anyone."56 Several essential prin-
ciples in relation to property follow from this original act and intention 
of God. The most important principle is that creation is the foundation 
of the principle of the universal destination of the earth's goods57-
what the Pope has called the "characteristic principle of Christian 
social doctrine."58 Yet, in creation, God also provides the gift of the 
earth so that each person "might have dominion over it by his work 
and enjoy its fruits."59 Indeed, it is the true self fulfillment and culti-
vation of the divine image expressed in the exercise of dominion over 
the things of the world that are the foundation of the right to prop-
erty.60 The resulting ownership includes, among other things, land, 
capital, and "know-how, technology and skill."61 Yet, all manifestations 
of ownership always must be evaluated on the basis of the prior and 
pre-eminent principle of the universal destination of the world's goods. 
Thus the Pope has stated that the right to private property is "valid 
and necessary" but that the right nevertheless has a "social mort-
gage" -that is, the right has an "intrinsically social function based 
upon and justified precisely by the principle of the universal destina-
tion of goods."62 
The proposed takings legislation, by contrast, projects a strong 
sense of the inviolability of the right to property. Since the language 
of the legislation does not reveal the basis for such a theory of prop-
erty, it will be instructive to consider, in light of Catholic social teach-
ing, the theory of property in Professor Epstein's Takings.63 Indeed, 
it is not too much to say that Professor Epstein's theory of property 
determines many of the rest of his conclusions, just as it is an under-
lying theory of private property that determines other public con-
cerns in the takings legislation. 
Several preliminary remarks are in order. The first relates to John 
Locke's celebrated theory of property, which Professor Epstein uses 
to support his claim of a natural right to property. Indeed, many 
supporters of takings legislation invoke Locke's ardent defense of the 
56 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, at 'V 31. 
57 [d. 
58 SOLLICUTUDO, supra note 38, 'V 42. 
59 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, 'V 31. 
60 See id. 'V 43; SOLLICUTUDO, supra note 38, 'V 30. 
61 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, 'V'V 31-32; LABOREM, supra note 47, 'V 14. 
62 SOLLICUTUDO, supra note 38, 'V 42. 
63 See generally EpSTEIN, supra note 25. 
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right to property in The Second Treatise of Government.64 There are 
no doubt several close affinities between the proposed takings legis-
lation and the classic political treatise: mainly, the close link of per-
sonhood and property and an intense wariness of tacit and arbitrary 
government actions. Yet it also must be noted that Locke's theory 
does not on its own necessarily justify current takings legislation. For 
one thing, Locke grounds the natural right to property on God's 
original gift of creation.65 From such a beginning, it would be possible 
to argue in a manner taking greater account of a wide range of public 
issues like environmental protection than is possible with an exclusive 
theory of property such as that behind the takings legislation.66 More-
over, while Locke states that not even a part of a person's property 
may be taken without consent,67 he also signals the legitimacy of 
strong legislative regulation of property when he explains: "[b]ut still 
it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving 
it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them."68 
These observations underscore Professor Epstein's unusual use of 
Locke's theory of property and help situate Professor Epstein's par-
ticular brand of liberalism. Professor Epstein invokes Locke as he 
seeks to place himself in the tradition of natural rights. Like Locke, 
Professor Epstein asserts that these rights are not derived from the 
state. However, Professor Epstein explicitly disavows the Lockean 
basis for these rights-the act of divine creation.69 In place of this 
theological ground, Professor Epstein introduces a systematic, utili-
tarian theory of wealth maximization that is the fundamental basis of 
political organization and the right to property.70 This basis of political 
64 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1980). See generally EpSTEIN, 
supra note 25. 
65 LOCKE, supra note 64, ~ 25. 
66 MARK SAGOFF, UPSTREAM!DOWNSTREAM: ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 172-73 
(Donald Scherer ed., 1990). Andrew Lustig has argued that Locke's discussions of property and 
justice have three basic correspondences to similar discussions in the social encyclicals: both 
perspectives emphasize the "social character of the good to be pursued"; both also maintain the 
"moral priority of property in common"; and both hold it is a "legitimate function of government" 
to safeguard the "positive as well as the negative rights of individuals." Andrew B. Lustig, 
Natural Law, Property, and Justice: The General Justification of Property in John Locke, 19 
J. OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS 1, 145 (Spring 1991). 
67 LOCKE, supra note 64, ~ 139. 
68 [d. ~ 140. 
69 EpSTEIN, supra note 25, at 10-11. 
70 Richard A. Epstein, Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain: An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3, 5 (1986) [hereinafter 
Outline]. 
842 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:829 
organization, then, sets the normative limit on the use of political 
power: that it "should preserve the relative entitlements among the 
members" of a polity.71 Yet, such a preservation of a status quo of 
property holdings is a minimum moral standard. In fact, Professor 
Epstein argues, the final moral measure is the increase of overall 
wealth while preserving and adding to the original property holdings: 
"All government action must be justified as moving a society from the 
smaller to the larger pie."72 
In this scheme, then, "natural rights," as Thomas Grey points out, 
are "simply those rights which, if postulated as initially binding, will 
maximize utility."73 Thus, Grey notes, Professor Epstein uses Locke's 
language as a "rhetorical" gloss for a utilitarian theory of property de-
rived from entirely different premises than Locke introduces.74 Grey 
explains: "[ w ]hen the verbiage about rigor and natural rights is stripped 
away, Epstein's core position is that 'private property' means that set 
of rules governing resource distribution and allocation that will pro-
duce the greatest good for the greatest number."75 Thus, it is possible 
to see more clearly Professor Epstein's place in liberal thought. Cass 
Sunstein, Professor of Law of the University of Chicago, has argued: 
[i]nsofar as it is political theory, Takings is part of a narrow strand 
of the liberal tradition, one that takes the existing distribution of 
property and the existing set of preferences as natural, rather 
than social, and disables government from affecting either. That 
strand of liberalism flourished during the Lochner76 era. A com-
peting species of liberal thought-reflected in much of modern 
law-sees the collective selection of preferences as a natural and 
desirable feature of government. This species of liberalism is, of 
course, subject to abuse. Those abuses can be controlled, however, 
thus promoting both welfare and autonomy in ways that are im-
possible under the approach in Takings.77 
The sharp contrast between Professor Epstein's view of property 
and a Catholic understanding can be seen by considering several 
crucial junctures in the argument in Takings.78 As I have already 
71 ld. at 10-11. 
72 ld. at 4. 
73 Grey, supra note 28, at 36. 
74 ld. at 31. 
75 ld. at 45. 
76 Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
77 Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain: Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 245, 251 (1986). 
78 See generally EpSTEIN, supra note 25. 
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noted, Professor Epstein rejects Locke's assumption of the original 
common ownership of the earth as a result of God's gift of creation to 
all. This assumption is, of course, the starting point for the theory of 
private property in Catholic social teaching. For Professor Epstein, 
however, this assumption of common ownership raises an insuperable 
difficulty in his Hobbesian world of possessive individualists. In other 
words, by starting with the premise of common ownership, one cannot 
account for the problem of having "to explain how any individual can, 
without the consent of others, reduce common property to private 
ownership."79 Rather, for Professor Epstein, a more solid philosophical 
basis for a right to property can be obtained by employing as a theory 
of property the traditional common law rule-in the original position 
each person only owns his or her labor; nothing is owned-either 
individually or in common-until the first possessor of any thing 
acquires it.SO In the scheme of Takings, this theory leads to the fact 
itself of ownership-and thus of any given distribution of property-
taking on unimpeachable moral importance. Professor Epstein, for 
instance, argues that trespass is not wrong because the state says it 
is wrong-a claim perfectly coincident with Catholic thought and the 
natural rights tradition. Rather, trespass is wrong "because individu-
als own property"Sl-a claim that from the point of view of Catholic 
teaching amounts to an assertion in search of justification. Moreover, 
on the basis of this theory of property Professor Epstein construes 
the entirety of the social aspect of ownership within the terms of 
private positive law-that is, that what is "social" about ownership is 
the fact that ownership itself provides an inviolable right not to be 
interfered with by the rest of the world.s2 Of course, this is in flat 
contradiction to the Catholic understanding of the social obligations 
that both inhere in ownership and justify it. 
III. THE STATE, JUSTICE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 
For all of his invocations of Locke, Professor Epstein may, in the 
end, share more with Hobbes-especially as to anthropology. Profes-
sor Epstein insists, for instance, on the central, ineluctable desire to 
maximize wealth-a formulation of desire not unlike Hobbes's bleak 
79Id. at 10. 
8°Id. at II. 
8! Id. at 6. 
82Id. at viii. 
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picture of human nature, and sharply different from the Catholic 
understanding of a rational and social human nature. Moreover, like 
Hobbes, the texture of political life is in the end reduced to an indi-
vidual and the state, and thus parts ways with the rich Catholic 
understanding of the intermediate associations requisite for the achieve-
ment of the common good of political life. For Professor Epstein, 
political life is reduced to a wealth-maximizing individual and a com-
pliant state. As Professor Sunstein has noted, though, Professor Ep-
stein's assumption that the given preferences for wealth maximization 
must as such be accorded respect, is a departure from classical liberal 
politics: 
[f]or James Madison, national representatives were supposed to 
deliberate on constituent preferences, not to implement what con-
stituents "want" .... The republican conception of politics gener-
alizes this understanding, treating governance as a collective process 
in which citizens select ends through political participation. Tak-
ings ignores this aspect of the liberal tradition, which played an 
important role in the constitutional framing. For the framers, 
freedom consisted in self-governance through politics as well as 
in the satisfaction of private preferences.83 
It is this criticism of Professor Epstein's view of the state that 
informs my contention that the proposed takings legislation poses an 
anti-democratic threat to federal environmental protection. For the 
legislation would no doubt inhibit the enforcement of environmental 
laws already on the books and it would accomplish this inhibition by 
subordinating the power of the state-and the possibility the state 
represents of the achievement of a political common good-to the 
power of private preferences. It will be instructive to consider this 
contention in light of Catholic teaching on the state's role in regula-
tion, the ordering of goods in justice, and the common good. 
In Centesimus,84 Pope John Paul II states that it is the state's task 
to provide for the defense and preservation of common goods such as 
the environment "which cannot be safeguarded simply by market 
forces."85 By such provision, the state working with the rest of society 
fulfills its "duty of defending those collective goods which, among 
others, constitute the essential framework for the legitimate pursuit 
of personal goals on the part of each individual."86 Thus, the environ-
ment is a limit on the market. It is a "collective and qualitative" need 
83 Sunstein, supra note 77, at 246-47. 
84 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37. 
85 ld. ~ 40. 
86 ld. (emphasis in original). 
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which escapes the market's logic and which requires the state's pro-
tection.87 Yet, to insist that environmental protection is a task of the 
state is not yet to have specified at what level of government this task 
should be carried out. For this judgement Catholic teaching provides 
the principle of subsidiarity. As defined by Pius XI in Quadragesimo 
Anno,88 the principle states that "it is an injustice, a grave evil and a 
disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to 
arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by 
smaller and lower bodies."89 The encyclical goes on to note: 
[t]he State should leave to these smaller groups the settlement of 
business of minor importance. It then will perform with greater 
freedom, power and success the tasks belonging to it, because it 
alone can effectively accomplish these directing, watching, stimu-
lating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity de-
mands.90 
Thus while the principle of subsidiarity favors action by the "smaller 
and lower bodies," it is important to note that it neither precludes 
action by the state nor by the largest polity within a state-so long 
as that polity is the one appropriate for the political task at issue.91 In 
the matter at hand, then, the principle asks whether there are aspects 
of environmental protection that require the federal government's 
involvement. Clearly there are: among them, the many environmental 
and public health problems that cross state lines, the need in some 
aspects of regulatory law for uniform federal standards, and the fed-
eral government's power to enforce laws that less powerful state and 
local agencies cannot. Accordingly, the proposed takings legislation 
would not only inhibit the state from carrying out its duty to defend 
a collective good like the environment, but the legislation specifically 
would frustrate the federal government in seeing to those tasks of 
environmental protection that only it can and should perform. 
Catholic teaching as well acknowledges that it is a principal task of 
the state to guarantee private property. This protection is vital so that 
"those who work and produce can enjoy the fruits of their labor and 
thus feel encouraged to work efficiently and honestlY,"92 thereby cre-
ating the economic life of society. How, then, is it possible fairly to 
87 [d. 
88 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1939) [hereinafter QUADRAGESIMOj. 
89 [d. ,. 86. 
90 [d. ,. 87. 
91 [d. " 86-87. 
92 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, ,. 48. 
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balance the legal regimen governing the goods of the environment 
and private property? 
The concepts of commutative and social justice are of assistance 
here. Drawing on Aquinas, Pius XI applied these principles to prop-
erty.93 The right to possession of property, Pius said, is governed by 
commutative justice or the justice of contracts.94 This kind of justice 
requires an exact numerical equivalence of exchange: for example, it 
is the kind of justice regnant in Takings, where every loss in property 
value at the state's hands requires an exact numerical compensation. 
Commutative justice, then, is a "pure" type of justice in that it is, in 
itself, concerned only with the immediate exchange at hand and not 
with broader questions of social or political significance. Nevertheless, 
the demand for commutative justice always occurs in social or political 
contexts, even if this form of justice is able to give only a partial 
response to the conflicting claims inevitably arising in such contexts. 
Jesuit theologian David Hollenbach has noted: "[t]here are goods or 
values necessary for the realization of human dignity which transcend 
the sphere of private interaction and contract which is the concern of 
commutative justice .... Individuals come to share in these goods in 
a way that is mediated by political, economic, and cultural struc-
tures."95 
Yet, while for Pius XI, the right to property was governed by 
commutative justice, the use of property fell under the purview of 
social justice. Social justice is the virtue that has as its aim the 
securing of the common good-a good that is analogically different 
from an individual good like the right to property just as, according 
to Aquinas, the political community and the family differ specifically.96 
Social justice primarily manifests itself in the 
ordering of rights through legislation and other forms of govern-
mental activity. This governmental power to intervene and coerce 
arises from the interdependent character of human existence and 
from the fact that some rights are claims on goods which are 
essentially public and which cannot be weighed out and distrib-
uted piecemeaP7 
93 See QUADRAGESIMO, supra note 88, " 86--87. 
94 See id. 
95 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2a, 2ae, 5--7, 58, 61 (Christian Classics repro 1981); 
DAVID HOLLENBACH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: RETRIEVING AND RENEWING THE CATHOLIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS TRADITION 143-48 (1979); see QUADRAGESIMO, supra note 88, 'If 24. 
96 AQUINAS, supra note 95, 2a, 2ae, 7, 58; QUADRAGESIMO, supra note 88, 'If 24. 
97 HOLLENBACH, supra note 95, at 155. 
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In tr.ese tenns, then, the takings legislation is commutative justice 
writ large-too large. This legislation, following Professor Epstein, 
construes the public realm in exclusively private terms, or, as Profes-
sor Epstein puts it: "[t]here is no clean break on that continuum 
between disputes with two parties and those with two hundred mil-
lion.''98 Professor Epstein also rejects the possibility of adjudicating 
claims between collectivities and individuals: "[t]here is simply no 
common metric which allows one to balance the interests of groups or 
entities against individuals.''99 Thus, where in Catholic thought com-
mutative justice should be applied to discrete private exchanges, in 
the proposed takings legislation it is misapplied to fundamentally 
public goods. Accordingly, in this legislation, commutative justice in-
trudes into the sphere of social justice and effectively inhibits the 
possibility of action by the state on behalf of the common good. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is important to consider the proposed takings 
legislation's impact on the common good. As I have noted, one likely 
effect of the legislation would be to inhibit federal protection of the 
environment for the common good: those charged by law with the task 
of enforcement obviously will hesitate to carry out their duties if the 
consequences of doing so include the payment of potentially huge 
sums of money to property owners. Indeed, it is not farfetched to say 
that a primary goal of the proposed legislation is precisely to inhibit 
federal environmental protection. 
But it is important to note the specific manner of this inhibition. 
For it is not the Catholic view that social justice gives the state or 
society unlimited warrant to regulate a common good like the envi-
ronment. Thus, there are no doubt manifold occasions when existing 
legislation in service of a common good like the environment must be 
changed to accommodate the just claims of personal and social rights.1°O 
The problem with the proposed takings legislation-as with Professor 
Epstein's theories-is that it is not so much an effort at an accommo-
dation as a means around arriving at a new balance of personal and 
public concerns. There is no attempt here to find a new political 
consensus about environmental protection that could result, if neces-
98 EpSTEIN, supra note 25, at ix. 
99 Outline, supra note 70, at 5. 
100 HOLLENBACH, supra note 95, at 153. 
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sary, in a readjustment of the federal environmental apparatus or the 
streamlining of citizens' appeals in the face of violations by intrusive 
bureaucrats.lOl Instead, the proposed legislation is an evasion of these 
profoundly "political" and "public" questions in favor of a deceptively 
schematic solution that fails to risk a public debate over existing laws 
while it succeeds in checking their application. 
This sort of evasion raises important moral questions for the Catho-
lic Church. One question has to do with the deterioration of political 
life signaled by the foreclosure of the possibility of achieving a new 
political consensus. Another effect of this evasiveness-especially if 
takings legislation is applied to a broad range of federal law-could 
be a growing cynicism towards the law. In other words, people may 
develop a hopelessness arising from the recognition that there are 
laws but that they cannot be enforced. In his classic treatise, Aquinas 
said: "[i]n order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to 
a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by 
it."lo2 Yet, the proposed legislation would undermine the possibility of 
application of environmental laws and thereby would undermine the 
idea of law itself. A related matter of moral corrosion bears on the 
legitimacy of the right to property itself. As Pope John Paul II has 
expressed, the right to property derives its legitimacy from its serv-
ice to the common good-whether this service results from individual 
generosity, societal influence, or the force of law. 103 Given this condi-
101 The House of Representatives debated and rejected a number of amendments that sought 
more extensively to balance concerns for property with protection of the environment. During 
the course of one such debate, Representative Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md.) asked: 
[s]o how do we as humans solve this particular dilemma? Do we solve it by talking and 
discussing with the regulators, with Members of Congress, with the landholders about 
what they can do with their property and still hold onto biodiversity for future 
generations? Or do we solve the problem by sterilizing debate, by saying that we are 
going to take care of this and if some regulator comes in there and wants to take your 
property or regulate your property, we are going to compensate you, flat out, the 
Federal Government will pay for you not to abide by the Endangered Species Act, or 
for protecting wetlands. 
141 CONGo REG. H2537 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wayne Gilchrest). 
Representative John Ehlers (R-Mich.) raised a similar concern later in the same debate: 
I can tell you from our experience with takings in Michigan that once we turn the 
bureaucrats around and say, uNo, you cannot just simply say no to some alternatives, 
you have to sit down with the property owners when they have a permit, you have to 
sit down with them and discuss alternatives with them." That solved virtually all of 
the problems that we had. 
[d. at H2543 (statement of Rep. John Ehlers). 
102 AQUINAS, supra note 95, at la, 2ae, 4, 90. 
103 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, ~ 31. 
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tion for legitimacy, it is not then inconceivable that an assertion of 
inviolable property rights which is seen to undermine the common 
good could in fact lead to a diminished respect for the right to own-
ership itself. 
The richness of Catholic social ethics-with its balancing of per-
sonal and public concerns and its understanding of a rational, social 
person-challenges many assumptions behind this legislation and of-
fers a way to balance a concern for private property with a concern 
for the common good of the environment. This is no doubt only one 
piece of legislation in a vast sea of social issues. But the issues it raises 
about the private and social aspects of property, such as the percep-
tion of the environment as a common good, the need rationally and 
politically to arrive at new balances of personal and social claims, a 
related wariness of absolute, one-size-fits-all political solutions, and 
the size and function of the state-all of these issues are in the air 
today and require careful attention in Catholic social ethics. Indeed, 
it fairly can be asked whether the thought represented by Takingsl04 
and the fact of the proposed legislation represent an instance of what 
Pope John Paul II called in Centesimus a "crisis within democracies 
themselves, which seem at times to have lost the ability to make 
decisions aimed at the common good."105 This crisis, the Pope says, is 
evident in a "growing inability to situate particular interests within 
the framework of a coherent vision of the common good"106-a descrip-
tion that aptly could be applied to the clashing claims of commutative 
and social justice provoked by the legislation. Another sign of this 
crisis, according to the Pope, is a view of the common good as simply 
a sum of particular interests-a characterization that calls to mind the 
individualism and monetarization of public life signaled by the legis-
lation's schemes of compensation. Lastly, the Pope calls at the present 
time for a development of a sense of the common good "on the basis 
of a balanced hierarchy of values"107-a balance that this legislation 
profoundly would undermine. 
104 EpSTEIN, supra note 25. 
105 CENTESIMUS, supra note 37, 'If 3l. 
106 [d. 
107 [d. 
